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By Liming Guan, Steven Daoping He and John Mc Eldowney 
Can seemingly small rounding manipulations inﬂ uence 
ﬁnancial statement users’ perception of credit quality? 
From an accounting perspective, the term“window dressing” refers to a wide range oftechniques that an audit client might use to
enhance the ﬁnancial position of an entity through
manipulated disclosures. For the purposes of this
article, the term will be more strictly deﬁ ned. Win-
dow dressing, as used in
this article, refers to the
reporting practices ad-
opted by some ﬁ rms to
intentionally distort earn-
ings and the statement
of position by chang­
The incentive to report rounded earnings 

to meet the requirements of debt 

covenants is a particularly important issue

in the lending industry.ing the way the ﬁ nancial
figures are perceived by
stakeholders. This occurs
when a stakeholder is presented with a manipu­
lated earnings ﬁgure that is marginally greater
than the actual value. For example, if a ﬁ rm’s
income for the year is $5.99 million, management
may fraudulently increase the reported earnings
ﬁgure to one that is slightly above $6.0 million.
Because of the way the human brain processes how
numbers are perceived, this practice has a strong
tendency to manipulate stakeholders’ perceptions
concerning the proﬁtability of a ﬁ rm. Stakeholders
may perceive a more favorable ﬁ nancial position
than is warranted under the circumstances. While
the fraudulent alteration of the reported amounts
can be relatively immaterial, the impact on users’
perceptions can be substantial. As found by the
authors, such rounding behavior is a common
practice in companies both in the United States
and around the world.1 
The research to date on the subject suggests
two primary economic incentives for firms to
engage in this type of manipulative behavior.
One incentive relates to perceptions of earnings
figures as key cognitive reference points in the
eyes of financial statement users. For example,
general sales practice holds that pricing a prod­
uct at $1.99 encourages consumers to view a
product at this price to
be significantly cheaper
than one marked, say,
$2.00. Science theorizes
that this perceptual dis­
continuity is most likely
caused by the way the
human brain perceives
numeric data. In essence,
the brain tends to store
what it perceives to be the most relevant bits of
information about a number (or the price of a
product as in the previous illustration). In the
eyes of a consumer, a price of $698 is more likely
to be perceived to be “six hundred and some­
thing” rather than “almost seven hundred.” This
is because the process of rounding up is a more
complex process for the human brain than that
of rounding down.2 Extrapolating this concept to
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Window Dressing in Reported Earnings 
the financial markets can help explain the incen­
tive management might have in manipulating
the reported earnings of a firm. From a financial
statement perspective, earnings of $598,000 may
be perceived by investors to be much lower than
$600,000. There would be a distinct tendency for
stakeholders to view the earnings as “five hun­
dred and some thousand” rather than “nearly six
hundred thousand.” Knowing that marginally
modified earnings figures could change an in­
vestor’s perception of a firm’s future earnings, it
would be in management’s best interest to round
up financial totals whenever possible to positively
influence the behavior of stakeholders. 
A second incentive for management to round up
various ﬁnancial ﬁgures relates to the use of con­
tracts. Contracts dealing with lending agreements,
compensation contracts related to budgets, etc., 
normally tend to be created using ex ante estimates.
In practice, these contracts tend to be based on
rough ﬁgures that emphasize the ﬁrst digit in the
contractual ﬁgure. Because of this, small changes
in the contractual parameters may have large cash
ﬂow effects.3 Ironically, this practice has come to
be known as “earnings management.” 
The process of rounding up reported ﬁnancial
ﬁgures for a company normally won’t be chal-
lenged by the ﬁrm’s external auditors because it
is likely to be viewed as “immaterial.”4 However,
such practice obviously impairs the quality of
reporting for the company’s ﬁnancial statements.
This impairment is evidenced by comments by
Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). In a speech
delivered at New York University, he warned that
earnings management by corporate America was
signiﬁcantly eroding the quality of the ﬁnancial
reporting process.
The incentive to report rounded earnings to
meet the requirements of debt covenants is a
particularly important issue in the lending in­
dustry. Lenders, by necessity, are concerned not
only with a borrower’s operating and financial
risks but also with the representational faithful­
ness of the borrower’s financial statements. The
prevalence of earnings manipulation creates a
significant risk burden on the lending industry.
In addition, this incentive to marginally increase
financial totals to meet contractual agreements
may not be homogeneous for firms in different
industries. Therefore, in forming day-to-day lend­
ing decisions, lenders would also be interested in
evidence of the extent of earnings manipulation
across industry groups. 
The purpose of this article is to use digital analy­
sis based on Benford’s Law to investigate and
compare the extent of window dressing (that is,
reporting rounded earnings) among U.S. firms in
a number of specified industries. The existence of
these practices within the various firm categories






Benford demonstrated that the expected distribu­
tions of naturally occurring numbers are skewed
toward the number one for the leading digit in a
multidigit number and toward the number zero
in the second position of a number.5 This law, also
known as the ﬁrst-digit law, maintains that for
many diverse types of numerically based data,
e than 30 percent ofthe number one occurs mor
the time as the ﬁrst digit in a multidigit number.
Ancillary to this axiom is that the larger the digit
is, the less chance it has of being in the ﬁrst posi­
tion. For example, as can been seen from Exhibit 1,
the number nine has the least chance of being the
ﬁrst digit in a discrete number stream. Intuitively,
Exhibit 1. Expected Frequency Occurrences for 
Each Digit in the First and Second Places 
Digit 
First Digit Expected 
Frequency Percentage 
Second Digit Expected 
Frequency Percentage 
0 — 11.968 
1 30.103 11.389 
2 17.609 10.882 
3 12.494 10.433 
4 9.691 10.031 
5 7.918 9.668 
6 6.695 9.337 
7 5.799 9.035 
8 5.115 8.757 
9 4.576 8.500 
Source: Nigrini and Mittermaier (1997) 
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Window Dressing in Reported Earnings 
one would guess that all numbers would have an
equal chance of being the ﬁrst number, that is, each
would have an 11.1-percent chance of being in that
position. As unintuitive as it may seem though, per
Benford’s Law, the real probability of a ﬁ rst digit
being either a one, two or a three is more than 60
percent. Exhibit 1 shows the expected occurrences
of each digit in the ﬁrst and second places. 
Benford’s Law applies to many different types of
data that describe the relative sizes of similar phe­
nomena, such as market values, earnings or daily
trading volumes of New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) ﬁrms. As long as there are no externally
imposed constraints, such as arbitrarily imposed
maximum and/or minimum values (as would be
the case for union-based minimum hourly rates,
for example), Benford’s Law will hold true. For
example, one would expect a higher number of
ones as the ﬁrst digit than the numbers two, three,
four and so on in the population of any given city
over time.
Benford’s Law also provides the basis for digi­
tal analysis of a sequence of numbers of similar
nature. For example, such analysis has been used
in a wide variety of ways to identify instances
of employee theft and tax evasion.6 In addition,
software that incorporates digital analysis based
on Benford’s Law has been adopted by many large
international audit ﬁrms. And, as discussed above,
it has proved helpful in identifying instances of
window dressing among various firms in the
United States and other countries. 
Data and Methodology 
The Standard & Poor ’s Research Insight database
was used to supply the primary data used in this
study. The analysis included the annual net incomes 
of both active and inactive ﬁrms listed on the NYSE, 
American Stock Exchange (ASE) and NASDAQ for
1950 through 2005. The ﬁnal sample consisted of
194,720 positive earnings observations. 
Second Digit 
Industry Group 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Energy 2.47 *** -0.08 0.20 -0.09 -0.52 0.18 -0.76 ** -0.30 -0.23 -0.88 ***
 (n = 7,899) 6.76 0.22 0.54 0.24 1.53 0.53 2.28 0.91 0.69 2.78 
Construction 2.22 *** 0.09 -0.78 ** -0.05 -0.11 0.77 ** -0.30 -0.40 -0.39 -1.06 ***
 (n = 8,378) 6.25 0.25 2.29 0.13 0.32 2.39 0.93 1.24 1.24 3.47 
Capital goods 2.02 *** -0.02 -0.31 ** -0.13 -0.18 -0.04 -0.03 -0.21 -0.16 -0.94 ***
 (n = 39,308) 12.36 0.12 1.98 0.83 1.18 0.27 0.20 1.42 1.10 6.70 
Transportation 1.73 *** -0.20 0.00 0.15 -0.74 ** -0.45 0.18 0.11 -0.30 -0.50
 (n = 7,549) 4.61 0.52 0.00 0.41 2.14 1.30 0.54 0.34 0.88 1.53 
Finance 1.65 *** 0.24 0.17 0.02 -0.27 -0.13 -0.27 -0.32 * -0.35 ** -0.75 ***
 (n = 30,833) 8.92 1.33 0.92 0.09 1.56 0.74 1.61 1.91 2.17 4.68 
Consumer goods 1.57 *** -0.03 0.10 -0.14 -0.23 ** -0.03 -0.11 -0.09 -0.24 ** -0.81 ***
 (n = 71,930) 12.96 0.23 0.82 1.21 2.05 0.26 0.96 0.81 2.27 7.75 
Basic Industries 1.52 *** -0.06 -0.33 0.27 -0.15 0.04 0.29 -0.40 -0.11 -1.09 ***
 (n = 12,334) 5.20 0.20 1.18 0.96 0.53 0.15 1.11 1.50 0.40 4.32 
Utilities 0.68 *** 0.27 -0.01 -0.38 0.29 0.13 -0.30 -0.16 -0.31 -0.23
 (n = 16,489) 2.69 1.09 0.02 1.60 1.23 0.56 1.31 0.66 1.36 1.06 
Expected 
proportion (%) 
11.97  11.39  10.88  10.43 10.03  9.67 9.34 9.04 8.76 8.50 
Exhibit 2. Distributions of the Second Digits of Positive Annual Earnings by Industry Groups 
Note: The ﬁrst number in each cell of industry groups represents the percentage deviation from expected proportion. For example, for ﬁrms in the 
energy industry, the expected proportion for zero in the second digit was 11.97 percent. The actual proportion was 11.97 + 2.47 = 14.44 percent.
The second number reports the Z-statistic (in italics). The expected proportion in percentage of each number (0–9) in the second place of the earn­
ings is reported in the last row. 
*, ** and *** are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 



















































Window Dressing in Reported Earnings 
Benford’s Law helps to predict the normal level
of number duplication in a particular set of data.
In other words, this makes it possible to identify
numbers that don’t “ﬁt” the norm that is expected.
By deﬁnition, this would include fraudulently
generated numbers by managers wishing to alter
the actual earnings ﬁgures to their own advantage.
Statistically speaking, if managers manipulate
earnings by altering the ﬁnancial numbers, then
one would expect to observe an abnormal occur­
rence of certain numbers in the second position
for these disclosed ﬁgures. More speciﬁ cally, there
would be more zeros and fewer nines in the second
digit position than predicted by Benford’s Law.
To test the signiﬁcance of an abnormal distribu­
tion, a comparison was made of each number in the 
second place of disclosed ﬁ nancial ﬁgures to the
expected occurrences of those numbers as projected 
by Benford’s Law. A normally distributed Z-statistic 
was used to perform a signiﬁcance test of the ob­
served deviations from the expected proportions. 
Results 
Earnings numbers for ﬁrms in eight industries were 
analyzed to try to discover any evidence of window 
dressing. The industry classiﬁcation was based on
one used by the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago.7 
Exhibit 2 presents the distributions of the second
digits for these individual industry groups. The
results are presented in descending order based
on the magnitude of deviation of zeros as the
second digit. The first number in each cell of the
industry groups represents the percentage devia­
tion from the expected proportion. The second
number (in italics) reports the Z-statistic of the
deviation, or Z-score. 
As expected, there were systematically more
zeros in the second place of reported earnings
across all industries. This is substantiated by the
highly significant Z-statistics generated for these
values. A highly significant Z-statistic would
indicate that the relationship being tested would
have been very unlikely to have occurred by
chance alone. The study also found that, except
for the transportation and utilities classification,
there were systematically fewer nines in the
second place of the reported earnings figures
across industries. This finding suggests that the
practice of rounding final figures on financial
statements is a fairly common practice among
firms in all industries. It could be argued that
the rounding activity is occurring because it is a
practical, common practice for most industries
when they present their final earnings figures in
the financial statements. However, to the extent
that the practice of window dressing may impair
Exhibit 3. Differences in the Observed Proportion of Zero as the Second Digit Among Industries 
Industry Groups Energy Construction 
Capital 






Construction 0.25 — 
Capital goods 0.45 0.20 — 
Transportation 0.74 0.49 0.29 — 
Finance 0.82* 0.57 0.37 0.08 — 
Consumer goods 0.90** 0.65* 0.45* 0.16 0.08 — 
Basic industries 0.95* 0.70 0.50 0.21 0.13 0.05 — 
Utilities 1.79*** 1.54*** 1.34*** 1.05** 0.97*** 0.89*** 0.84** — 
Note: The numerical values in the cells of this exhibit are derived from Exhibit 2. Each cell holds the difference in observed percentage 
of zero as the second digit between the industry in column and the industry in row. For example, the Energy/Utilities cell value, 
1.79, is the difference between the deviation of zero for ﬁrms in the energy industry (2.47 percent) and the deviation of zero for 
ﬁrms in the utilities industry (0.68). It suggests that energy ﬁrms engaged more often in window dressing than utilities ﬁ rms. 
Z-statistic (normal distribution) is used to test the difference in the observed percentage of zero as the second digit between any 
two industries. 
*, ** and *** are statistically signiﬁcant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. 
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Window Dressing in Reported Earnings 
the quality of earnings numbers, lenders should
be concerned with the rationale for such practices
on the part of management. This practice could
also be attributable to management’s incentive to
either change investor expectation of the firm’s
future prospects or to meet the requirements of
various debt covenants. 
The tabulated data in Exhibit 2 also show that
the magnitude of window dressing is not homo­
geneous, or equally balanced, across industries.
Finding an eight or a seven in the second digit
is contrary to what Benford’s Law would hold.
If this occurs, it may be an indication that earn­
ings have been manipulated in some way, that
is, window dressing may be present. Likewise,
if the data follows the pattern outlined by the
law, then there should be a higher proportion of
earnings figures that do
not have higher numeri­
cal values in the second
position. For example,
in this study, firms in
the finance and the con-
sumer goods industries
had a lack of eights in the
There were systematically more zeros in 
the second place of reported earnings 
across all industries. 
second place of earnings.
This would indicate that for those industries, the
normal distribution, or ordering, of the digits in
the number corresponded to what was expected to
be found. The “pattern” of the individual numbers
“fits” with what Benford’s Law would predict. 
To empirically test for this possibility, the devia­
tion of zeros in the second place of earnings was
used to examine the degree of window dressing
across industries. The resultant analysis indicates
that ﬁrms in the energy industry have engaged
in the practice of window dressing more often
than any other industry category. The study also
shows that ﬁrms in the utilities industry appear to
engage least often in window dressing. The rest of
the industry classiﬁ cations—construction, capital
goods, transportation, ﬁnance, consumer goods
and basic industries—generated results that fell
between these two extremes.
Because this is an empirical study, the statistical 
signiﬁcance of the results must also be assessed. In 
essence, this means that for each value generated by 
the analysis, the research has to determine if the result
is a reﬂection of mere chance or the ﬁ nding actually 
represents the true underlying relationship in the 
overall data. To examine the statistical signiﬁ cance of
the degree of difference in window dressing among 
industries, an analysis was performed to address the
percentage deviation of zeros as the second digit of 
earnings between industries. Exhibit 3 presents these
differences and builds on the results displayed in 
Exhibit 2. The analysis shows that ﬁrms in the energy
industry have engaged in more pervasive window 
dressing than those in ﬁnance, consumer goods,
basic industries or utilities. Firms in the construction
and capital goods industries also show a higher level
of window dressing than those in consumer goods 
and utilities. The results show that ﬁrms in each of 
the other industry categories tend to have engaged in
substantially more window dressing than those com­
panies in the utilities industry category. Finally, the 
analysis indicates that the 
utilities industry category 
reﬂects the lowest instance
of window dressing. From
a risk perspective then,
if the quality of earnings 
is a factor affecting the
lending decisions, the
risk of ﬁrms in the energy 
industry appears to be the highest while the risk in 
utilities ﬁrms is the lowest. 
Summary 
Firms have a tendency to window-dress their ﬁ ­
nancial statements by rounding up their reported 
earnings in a way that, while often immaterial in 
dollar amount, could signiﬁcantly affect the deci­
sion-making processes of stakeholders. This practice
of reporting rounded earnings ﬁgures is perpetuated
for a number of reasons, including the following: 
Firms may believe that investors and creditors 
are more likely to perceive earnings figures
as being signiﬁcantly less than numbers that
can be “managed” by an organization through 
a rounding-up process (that is, $1.99 million
rounded up to a value of $2.0 million, which is 
perceived as signiﬁ cantly higher). 
Contracts between ﬁrms and stakeholders are 
likely to express earnings in round numbers. 
Using digital analysis based on Benford’s Law, this
study investigated the rounding behavior among 










































Window Dressing in Reported Earnings 
firms in various industries. The findings of the
study suggest that while the rounding behavior is 
observed in all industries, the pervasiveness of such 
behavior is not homogenous across industries, that 
is, the extent of this behavior varies depending on 
the industry classiﬁcation. The rounding behavior 
tends to occur most often among ﬁrms in the energy 
industry and least often among ﬁrms in the utilities 
industry. Such ﬁndings have important implications
for the lending decisions made by commercial banks
that traditionally have concerns about the quality of 
the borrower ’s ﬁnancial statements. With regard to 
lending risks based on the accuracy of the ﬁ nancials 
submitted to lenders, this study indicates that utili­
ties ﬁrms tend to have the lowest risk and the energy
ﬁrms tend to have the highest. 
This study did not examine which earnings
components are most likely to be manipulated or 
the general means employed by management to
achieve the target reported earnings. This would
be important data for lenders involved in debt cov-
enants with ﬁrms in these industries. If management
“successfully” achieves the earnings benchmarks, 
lenders should look into the most likely manipulated
accounts for evidence of whether management has 
been involved in fraudulent reporting practices. Al-
though there is little empirical evidence that window
dressing is a harmful practice, future research may 
focus on the means used by management to round 
earnings numbers and the effect of such behavior on 
the decision making of ﬁnancial statements users. 
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